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Note 
 
The Most Integrated Setting: Olmstead, Fry, and 
Segregated Public Schools for Students with 
Disabilities 
Trevor Matthews∗ 
The State of Georgia operates a network of schools for stu-
dents with disabilities called the Georgia Network for Educa-
tional and Therapeutic Support (GNETS).1 GNETS purports to 
“provide comprehensive educational and therapeutic support 
services to students who might otherwise require residential or 
other more restrictive placements.”2 However, the GNETS pro-
gram also segregates students with disabilities from their peers 
without disabilities in inferior school buildings with inferior ed-
ucational services.3 In fact, some GNETS school buildings were 
originally used as schools for African American students during 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank Sean Burke, Maren Hulden, and Dan Stewart at the Minnesota Disa-
bility Law Center for their advice, guidance, and support. I am also grateful to 
the staff and editors of Minnesota Law Review for their dedicated labor in pre-
paring the piece for publication. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Tara 
Hill Matthews, for inspiring me to write about inclusion and segregation, and 
for the long hours she spent editing this Note with me. I could not have written 
this without her. Copyright © 2018 by Trevor Matthews.  
 1. See Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support, GA. 
DEP’T EDUC., http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/ 
Special-Education-Services/Pages/Georgia-Network-for-Special-Education-and 
-Supports.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). As of November 30, 2017, the pro-
gram is still in operation. Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Alan Judd, Georgia “Psychoeducational” Students Segregated by Disa-
bility, Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://specials.myajc.com/ 
psychoeducation/; see also Timothy Pratt, The Separate, Unequal Education of 
Students with Special Needs, HECHINGER REP. (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www 
.hechingerreport.org/georgia-program-children-disabilities-separate-unequal 
-education. 
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de jure segregation.4 As if that particular irony were not enough, 
GNETS students are also disproportionately African American.5 
Students in GNETS schools also have unequal access to ex-
tracurricular activities and “do not have any opportunity to par-
ticipate in art, music, foreign language, vocational courses, . . . 
honors courses, or other electives. To the extent that GNETS 
programs offer elective courses, they are generally limited exclu-
sively to computer-based courses,” which offer no interpersonal 
interaction.6 Investigations revealed that some GNETS schools 
required students to undergo psychological experiments7, and 
that students at one GNETS school, Fitzhugh Lee, had been re-
strained with dog leashes.8 
In 2016, the Department of Justice initiated a novel lawsuit 
against the State of Georgia, alleging that the GNETS program’s 
segregation and inferior services violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)9 without alleging any violation of the In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).10 In its prayer 
for relief, the complaint asks that Georgia be required to 
“[p]rovide appropriate, integrated mental health and therapeu-
tic educational services and supports that are designed to allow 
students with behavior-related disabilities to be placed in inte-
grated general education classroom settings, and access to equal 
 
 4. Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter of Findings on United 
States’ Investigation of the Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic 
Support, D.J. No. 169-19-71, 3 (July 15, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/ 
documents/gnets_lof.pdf [hereinafter Letter of Findings]. 
 5. Judd, supra note 3. In fact, African American children are dispropor-
tionately placed in special education across the country. See NAT’L ALL. OF 
BLACK SCH. EDUCATORS ET AL., ADDRESSING OVER-REPRESENTATION OF AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 5 (2002). 
 6. Letter of Findings, supra note 4, at 15. 
 7. Judd, supra note 3. For a description of one such proposed test, see infra 
Part II.A. 
 8. Alan Judd, In Psychoeducational School, Behavioral Experiment for 
Troubled Child, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 5, 2016), https://specials.myajc.com/ 
psychoedexperiment/. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012); see Complaint ¶ 1, United States v. 
Georgia, No. 1:16-cv-03088 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/file/887356/download [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint]. As of 
this writing, the State has closed a number of GNETS schools, but has also 
moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that the Department of Justice lacks stand-
ing. Alan Judd, States’ Rights? Georgia Seeks To Dismiss Federal Suit over 
Schools for Disabled Students, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 2, 2016), http:// 
investigations.blog.ajc.com/2016/11/02/states-rights-georgia-seeks-to-dismiss 
-federal-suit-over-schools-for-disabled-students. 
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educational opportunities, to those in or at serious risk of enter-
ing the GNETS Program.”11 
The story of GNETS and the lawsuit it has spawned are em-
blematic of countless other stories of segregation, abuse, re-
straint, and seclusion that drive litigation designed to protect 
the rights of persons with disabilities across the United States. 
These suits, commonly referred to as “Olmstead litigation” after 
the landmark Supreme Court Case, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zim-
ring,12 rely on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act13 
and its implementing regulations14 to assert that government 
programs are failing to “provide community-based treatment for 
persons with mental disabilities” even though “such [treatment] 
is appropriate.”15  
Olmstead litigation has helped litigants with disabilities 
successfully sue, inter alia, prisons,16 sheltered workshops,17 
hospitals and treatment facilities,18 and residential facilities19 to 
 
 11. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, at 26. 
 12. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134. 
 14. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local 
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2017). 
 15. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. 
 16. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (holding that 
“the plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state prison 
inmates”). 
 17. See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 602 (D. Or. 2012). In Lane v. 
Kitzhaber, the District of Oregon certified a class of “‘all individuals in Oregon 
with intellectual or developmental disabilities who are in, or who have been 
referred to, sheltered workshops’ and ‘who are qualified for supported employ-
ment services.’” Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 32–33, Kitzhaber, 283 
F.R.D. 587, No. 3:12-cv-00138-ST). Class certification is often the same as a vic-
tory in class actions, and a settlement agreement was recently announced. Lane 
v. Brown Landmark Settlement Agreement Announced, DISABILITY RIGHTS OR. 
(Dec. 30, 2015), https://droregon.org/lane-v-brown-settlement. Governor Brown 
replaced former-Governor Kitzhaber as named plaintiff in the suit after Kitzha-
ber ’s resignation in 2015. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Day v. District of Columbia, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 
2012) (permitting an integration claim against nursing facilities to survive mul-
tiple dispositive motions). 
 19. See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 
187 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The adult homes at 
issue are institutions that segregate residents from the community and impede 
residents’ interactions with people who do not have disabilities. DAI has proven 
that virtually all of its constituents are qualified to receive services in supported 
housing, a far more integrated setting in which individuals with mental illness 
live in apartments scattered throughout the community and receive flexible 
support services as needed.”). 
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obtain better treatment or placement in a different, more agree-
able setting.20 
This Note examines the potential for Olmstead to be used to 
challenge a form of segregation and isolation that is still common 
across the country: segregating children with disabilities in 
schools that only serve students with disabilities (“segregated-
site” or “separate-site” schools).21 In addition, this Note will dis-
cuss some of the strategic and doctrinal issues that underpin 
such a lawsuit. Part I provides an introduction to the ADA and 
its implementing regulations, to Olmstead and its rationale, and 
to IDEA, the primary federal special education law.22 Part II ar-
gues that Olmstead and the ADA forbid schools from operating 
segregated facilities that only enroll students with disabilities, 
rather than placing them in similar classrooms in integrated 
schools in their community.23 Finally, Part III examines the 
 
 20. The litigants in Olmstead were placed in an institution against their 
will. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 588 (1999). The purpose 
of the suit was to obtain a placement in a less restrictive environment. See id. 
 21. The Department of Education collects a broad set of data on special ed-
ucation in the United States. IDEA Section 618 Data Products: State Level Data 
Files, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/ 
state-level-data-files/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Data]. 
In 2015, 146,581 children ages six through eighteen were in segregated schools 
for students with disabilities across the United States and Puerto Rico. See 
id. (download 2015 file on Child Count and Educational Environments). The 
Department of Education maintains this data in a comma separated 
value (CSV) file. See id. A spreadsheet compiling this data is on file with the 
author. 
 22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). 
 23. This line of reasoning may also raise a potential challenge to segregated 
classrooms, which would be an argument in favor of a concept called full-inclu-
sion. Full-inclusion is the idea that all children with disabilities should be in-
cluded in the general education classroom. See, e.g., Special Education Inclu-
sion, WIS. EDUC. ASS’N COUNCIL, http://www.weac.org/articles/specialedinc 
(“Full inclusion means that all students, regardless of handicapping condition 
or severity, will be in a regular classroom/program full time. All services must 
be taken to the child in that setting.”). Using Olmstead for a full-inclusion law-
suit is more difficult because there is a body of IDEA case law that upholds the 
segregated classrooms as a necessity for some students to receive a free appro-
priate public education. Cf., e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“We construe IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a 
school from placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if 
educating the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and sup-
port services, can be achieved satisfactorily.”). Despite decades of IDEA-based 
litigation, segregated special education classrooms persist across the country. 
In addition, full-inclusion is a controversial and fraught topic. See Stacey Gor-
don, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 189, 210–14 (providing a discussion of the larger debate around full-inclu-
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most salient defenses and challenges to such a claim: the need 
for administrative exhaustion, a state’s ability to rely on the de-
terminations of its own treating professionals, and the funda-
mental alteration defense. Although the issues surrounding the 
interaction of the ADA and IDEA are complicated, students’ 
right to integration is independently grounded in the ADA, sep-
arate from the protections of IDEA. 
I.  OLMSTEAD AND ITS FOUNDATIONS   
The Olmstead decision is, in part, the result of changing so-
cietal attitudes about how the state and its citizens can best meet 
the needs of persons with disabilities. This Part addresses the 
legal underpinnings of Olmstead litigation. Section A provides 
an overview of Title II of the ADA, which Olmstead interprets. 
Section B provides a brief overview of institutionalization, which 
underpins the rationale of Olmstead and much of its progeny. 
Section C provides an in-depth overview of Olmstead itself. Fi-
nally, Section D offers a basic explanation of IDEA, which has 
traditionally been the main vehicle for special education litiga-
tion, and a discussion of the material distinctions between the 
ADA and IDEA for purposes of the need for Olmstead litigation 
in the field of education. 
A. TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE 
INTEGRATION MANDATE 
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA,24 “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities.”25 In passing the 
ADA, Congress expressly found that “physical or mental disabil-
ities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in 
all aspects of society,” and that “historically, society has tended 
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, de-
spite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and perva-
sive social problem.”26 
 
sion); see also Megan Roberts, Comment, The Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Sit-
uations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1055 (2008) (provid-
ing another discussion of these tensions). Because of the complexity of the topic 
and the limited scope of the subjects covered here, this Note limits its discussion 
to challenging separate, segregated sites. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 25. Id. § 12101(b)(1). 
 26. Id. § 12101(a)(1)–(2). 
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For Olmstead claims, the most important provisions of the 
ADA are found in part A of Title II.27 These sections apply to any 
“public entity,” which is defined as “any State or local govern-
ment.”28 Under § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation 
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activi-
ties of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”29 The text of the Act frames discrimination as an 
issue of exclusion, that is, a denial of “benefits.”30 To prevent this 
exclusion, states are required to make “reasonable modifica-
tions” to their programs or services that facilitate access.31 
This text itself is remarkably broad, but there are two nu-
ances that are important to grasp. First, Title II of the ADA does 
not apply to the federal government—the statute unambigu-
ously references only “State or local government.”32 The Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)33 covers the Federal gov-
ernment instead, providing protections from discrimination that 
according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), are “at least 
equal” to those available under Title II.34 Therefore, discrimina-
tion under color of federal law will implicate different legal pro-
visions than improper action by a state, but will provide func-
tionally the same standards of liability and the same relief. 
Disability rights claims are often referred to as ADA or Section 
504 litigation with little to distinguish them.35 
Second, it is important to understand that the ADA’s protec-
tions are to be read broadly. The ADA protects all individuals 
with a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
 
 27. Id. §§ 12131–12134. 
 28. Id. § 12131(1)(A). 
 29. Id. § 12132. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. § 12131(2). 
 32. Id. § 12101(b)(1). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2012). 
 34. The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical Assistance Man-
ual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services, ADA.GOV, 
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (“It is the policy of the United States that all programs, pro-
jects, and activities receiving assistance under this chapter shall be carried out 
in a manner consistent with the principles of . . . respect for individual dignity, 
personal responsibility, self-determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers, 
based on informed choice, of individuals with disabilities . . . .”). 
 35. See, e.g., A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and Section 504, DISABILITY 
RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, http://www.dredf.org/advocacy/comparison.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2018) (comparing and contrasting IDEA, the ADA, and Sec-
tion 504). 
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one or more major life activities of such individual.”36 After pas-
sage of the ADA, in several cases, the Supreme Court limited the 
scope of the phrase “substantially limits,” by requiring a case-by-
case determination of disability which included mitigating fac-
tors (for example, the effect of glasses for those who have im-
paired vision).37 This functionally reduced the number of indi-
viduals covered by the ADA. Congress disapproved of the Court’s 
decision to narrow the scope of the ADA, and in 2008 it amended 
the Act “[t]o restore the intent and protections of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990.”38 These amendments added 
§ 12102(4)(A) to the act, which declares that Congress intends 
that the “definition of disability in this chapter shall be con-
strued in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chap-
ter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chap-
ter.”39 
The ADA is also broad in its condemnation of segregation. 
Section 12134 of the ADA authorizes the Attorney General to 
promulgate regulations implementing the ADA.40 Among those 
regulations is an important provision found at 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(d), commonly referred to as the “integration mandate” 
of Title II.41 The integration mandate declares that “[a] public 
entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the 
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified in-
dividuals with disabilities.”42 This provision enshrines a “broad 
view of discrimination.”43 People with disabilities have a right, 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 
 37. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999), su-
perseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (holding that “the determination of whether an individual is disabled 
should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s im-
pairment”); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) 
(requiring those “claiming the Act’s protection, to prove a disability by offering 
evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience . . . 
is substantial” rather than a per se rule based on specific disabilities). 
 38. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 1. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
§ 3(4)(A). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. 
 41. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF 
TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1, 
https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.pdf. 
 42. General Prohibitions Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) 
(2017) (emphasis added). 
 43. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 624 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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not just to receive services without discrimination based on their 
disabilities, but to receive those services in the “most integrated 
setting.”44 The integration mandate equates segregation from 
people without disabilities as a form of impermissible discrimi-
nation. The definition of disability discrimination enshrined in 
the ADA “encompasse[s] disparate treatment among members of 
the same protected class” by scrutinizing how the state treats 
certain citizens with disabilities in comparison to others.45 For 
purposes of the integration mandate, access to the larger com-
munity of people without disabilities is the opposite of this seg-
regation. 
Despite its breadth, the integration mandate is limited in 
one important way, referred to as a “fundamental alteration de-
fense.”46 The mandate requires states to offer services in the 
“most integrated setting,” but these provisions are subject to the 
requirement that courts weigh “the resources available to the 
State, not only the cost of providing community-based care to the 
litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others 
with mental disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out 
those services equitably.”47 ADA regulations instruct that, “[a] 
public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to 
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public 
entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activ-
ity.”48 
B. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS 
To understand why Olmstead ended up before the Supreme 
Court, it is important to understand a bit of the history of custo-
dial care for people with disabilities in the United States. Like-
wise, to understand why institutionalization should be opposed, 
it is helpful to understand its inefficiency and injustice and in-
equities. This Section provides a brief outline of Medicaid and its 
interactions with institutionalization (which led to Olmstead) as 
well as a summary of the problems with segregated, institutional 
care as a general matter. 
 
 44. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). 
 45. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 46. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 47. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
 48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (emphasis added). For more on the fundamen-
tal alteration defense, see infra Part III.C. 
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The Olmstead decision resulted, in part, from the enactment 
of Medicaid. The Social Security Amendments of 1965 provide 
for the administration of Medicaid.49 Because people with devel-
opmental disabilities, debilitating mental health challenges, and 
other severe disabilities are often indigent, many persons with 
disabilities are Medicaid recipients. The passage of the ADA en-
titled Medicaid recipients with disabilities to receive Medicaid 
services in an integrated setting, which led to lawsuits seeking 
integrated services, like Olmstead and its progeny. 
Originally, Medicaid provided for the comprehensive long-
term care of persons with disabilities exclusively through ser-
vices offered in institutions—like mental hospitals and nursing 
facilities.50 The exact definition of what constitutes an “institu-
tion” is murky, but regulation indicates that they have the effect 
of “isolating individuals receiving Medicaid . . . from the broader 
community of individuals not receiving Medicaid.”51 Isolation 
 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396, (a), (b), (c), (d) (2012). 
 50. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 1902(a)(13), 
79 Stat. 286, 345 (1965) (stating that State plans for medical assistance must 
“provide . . . for . . . institutional . . . care”); id. § 1905(a)(1), (4) 79 Stat. at 351 
(requiring medical assistance plans to provide “inpatient hospital services” and 
“skilled nursing home services”). 
Medicaid covers certain inpatient, comprehensive services as institu-
tional benefits. The word “institutional” has several meanings in com-
mon use, but a particular meaning in federal Medicaid requirements. 
In Medicaid coverage, institutional services refers to specific benefits 
authorized in the Social Security Act. These are hospital services, In-
termediate Care Facilities for People with Intellectual disability 
(ICF/ID), Nursing Facility (NF), Preadmission Screening & Resident 
Review (PASRR), Inpatient Psychiatric Services for Individuals Under 
Age 21, and Services for individuals age 65 or older in an institution 
for mental diseases. Institutions are residential facilities, and assume 
total care of the individuals who are admitted. 
Institutional Long Term Care, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
medicaid/ltss/institutional/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). This shift in 
policy is, in part, what led to the decision in Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581. As part of 
that ruling the court examined the State of Georgia’s insistence that Medicaid 
was designed with a preference for institutional care:  
The State urges that, whatever Congress may have stated as its find-
ings in the ADA, the Medicaid statute “reflected a congressional policy 
preference for treatment in the institution over treatment in the com-
munity.” The State correctly used the past tense. Since 1981, Medicaid 
has provided funding for state-run home and community-based care 
through a waiver program. 
Id. at 601 (citations omitted). 
 51. Contents of a Request for a Waiver, 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(c)(5)(v) (2017). 
Compare 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(c)(5)(i)–(iv) (describing settings that are not home 
and community based), with Basis and Purpose, 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (suggesting 
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and segregation are the hallmarks of institutionalization, and 
they are contrary to the integration mandate. 
Of course, deinstitutionalization is not just a goal in itself. 
Institutions for people with disabilities have a dark history.52 
Though institutions have always given vulnerable populations a 
place to live, stories of maltreatment and abuse of people with 
mental illnesses, as well as people with intellectual and develop-
mental disabilities, are commonplace even today.53 Institutions 
 
that Medicaid waiver programs “permit[ ] States to offer, under a waiver of stat-
utory requirements, an array of home and community-based services that an 
individual needs to avoid institutionalization”). 
 52. See generally E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING 
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1997) (providing a history of the struggle 
for deinstitutionalization). 
 53. See NORA J. BALADERIAN, ABUSE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: VIC-
TIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES SPEAK OUT: A REPORT ON THE 2012 NATIONAL SUR-
VEY ON ABUSE OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, SPECTRUM INST. 2 (2013), http:// 
www.disability-abuse.com/survey/survey-report.pdf (“The bottom line is that 
abuse is prevalent and pervasive, it happens in many ways, and it happens re-
peatedly to victims with all types of disabilities.”); John Rudolf, Where Mental 
Asylums Live On, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/ 
03/opinion/sunday/where-mental-asylums-live-on.html (“The United States be-
gan emptying out its vast asylum system in the 1960s, spurred by scathing re-
ports of abuse and neglect, like a 1946 Life magazine exposé that described 
many institutions as ‘little more than concentration camps.’”); see also Abuse 
and Exploitation of People with Developmental Disabilities, DISABILITY JUST., 
http://www.disabilityjustice.org/justice-denied/abuse-and-exploitation (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2018) (explaining that people with developmental disabilities are 
“are four to ten times more likely to be abused than their peers without disabil-
ities” and are otherwise vulnerable to abuse and mistreatment). For example, 
in Minnesota, patients at a state-run program for people with disabilities called 
METO, “were being routinely restrained in a prone, face down position and 
placed in metal handcuffs and leg hobbles.” STATE OF MINN., OMBUDSMAN FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, JUST PLAIN WRONG: EX-
CESSIVE USE OF RESTRAINTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT STYLE DEVICES ON DE-
VELOPMENTALLY DISABLED RESIDENTS AT THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES MINNESOTA EXTENDED TREATMENT PROGRAM (METO) CAM-
BRIDGE, MN 17 (2008). This abuse was only noticed when one patient’s mother 
noticed that her child was coming home with “marks and bruises” around his 
wrist, caused by the restraints. Sasha Aslanian, Lawsuit Settled Over Treat-
ment of Disabled Residents in State-Run Institution, MPR NEWS (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2011/12/01/lawsuit-settled-state-institution 
(providing further information on the “improper and inhumane” treatment of 
patients with developmental disabilities at METO, which closed in 2011). This 
occurred, despite the recognition nearly sixty years prior that the use of me-
chanical restraints for the institutionalized mentally ill was morally adverse. 
See Statement by Governor Luther W. Youngdahl at the Burning of Restraints 
(Oct. 31, 1949), https://mn.gov/mnddc/past/pdf/40s/49/49-SGL-Youngdahl.pdf 
(describing an event where people gathered “to destroy the strait-jackets, shack-
les, and manacles” once used in Anoka State [Mental] Hospital and to decry the 
devices as “barbarous”). 
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keep people with disabilities out of sight and out of mind while 
also perpetuating societal stigmas against those who suffer from 
mental health challenges or other disabilities.54 These draw-
backs are not the result of a trade-off. Institutional care is ex-
pensive, restrictive, and often has inferior health outcomes for 
residents than less restrictive and less costly alternatives.55 One 
intuitive reason that institutional care is so expensive is that it 
isolates people with disabilities from friends and family who 
would ordinarily aid in their care, forcing the state to pay for 
that service.56 The institutionalization of people with disabilities 
 
 54. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 
86 VA. L. REV. 397, 424–25 (2000) (discussing in general the “systematic disad-
vantage experienced by people with disabilities”); see also id. at 446 (“Individu-
als with [disabilities] are likely to be deemed outside of the norm for which social 
institutions and physical structures are designed. To safeguard their access to 
opportunities, they are therefore likely to need the ADA’s protection against 
discrimination and its requirement of accommodation.”). This belief that people 
with disabilities are not designed for normal society is exactly what permits 
segregation in institutions. This stigmatization is expressed in a myriad of other 
ways. For example, “In some cases, [people with disabilities] were required by 
law to stay at home; as late as 1974, some major American jurisdictions still 
maintained ‘ugly laws’ that prohibited ‘unsightly’ people—a category that en-
compassed people with disabilities—from appearing in public.” Id. at 442 (quot-
ing Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 
n.2 (1987)). 
 55. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) 
(“[C]ommunity placements cost less than institutional confinements.”). Num-
bers from states bear this out. See, e.g., Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 
F.3d 1175, 1186 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In Oklahoma, it costs approximately 
$28,000 per year to provide care to a disabled individual in a nursing home, and 
$14,000 to provide care through the Home and Community Based Waiver pro-
gram.”); see also Michael J. Berens & Patricia Callahan, A Troubled Transition: 
In the Rush to Close Institutions, Illinois Ignored Serious Problems in Group 
Homes, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
watchdog/grouphomes/ct-group-home-investigations-cila-met-20161229 
-htmlstory.html (“In [Illinois in] 2012, state officials calculated the annual cost 
of care for an institutionalized resident was about $219,000, compared with 
$84,000 at a group home.”). 
 56. Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: “Most Inte-
grated Setting Appropriate” Requirements and the Independent Living Model of 
Long-term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 17, 18 (2001) (describing how “informal 
caregivers in 1997, provid[ed] the economic value of $196 billion in uncompen-
sated services”). This is not to say that those caregivers should necessarily re-
main unpaid. One waiver program in Minnesota, called Consumer Directed 
Community Supports, permits waiver recipients to hire and pay their own care-
givers, including friends and family. See MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., CON-
SUMER DIRECTED COMMUNITY SUPPORTS CONSUMER HANDBOOK 10 (“The per-
son or persons you hire could be immediate family members, friends, neighbors 
or coworkers.”). See generally Consumer Directed Community Supports, 
MN.GOV, https://mn.gov/dhs/people-we-serve/people-with-disabilities/services/ 
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is not limited to residential settings. For example, many adults 
with intellectual disabilities spend their working hours in segre-
gated workshops57 and, as will be discussed further below, many 
students with disabilities are placed in separate, segregated ed-
ucational settings.58 In passing the ADA, Congress also found 
that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities per-
sists in such critical areas as . . . public accommodations, educa-
tion, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionali-
zation, health services, voting, and access to public services.”59 
Critics of institutionalization note that people with disabili-
ties experience isolation and discontent,60 and that that disabil-
ity integration results in prosocial outcomes.61 The congressional 
findings that accompany the ADA in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) 
demonstrate that Congress considered these problems in pass-
ing the law.62 Congress declared that isolation, segregation, and 
institutionalization are a “serious and pervasive social problem,” 
that “census data, national polls, and other studies have docu-
mented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an infe-
rior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged so-
cially, vocationally, economically, and educationally,” and  
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on 
 
home-community/programs-and-services/cdcs.jsp (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) 
(providing information on the Consumer Directed Community Supports pro-
gram). 
 57. Laura C. Hoffman, An Employment Opportunity or a Discrimination 
Dilemma?: Sheltered Workshops and the Employment of the Disabled, 16 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 151, 153 (2013) (providing a brief history and overview of 
sheltered workshops in the United States). 
 58. See Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/ 
fastfacts/display.asp?id=59 (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (indicating that 13.8% of 
students with disabilities spend “less than 40%” of their educational time in 
integrated general education classrooms and providing other similar statistics). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012). 
 60. See, e.g., NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SEGREGATED & EX-
PLOITED: THE FAILURE OF THE DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE QUAL-
ITY WORK 8 (2011), http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/ 
Publications/Reports/Segregated-and-Exploited.pdf (“Segregated work facili-
tates feelings of isolation for many people and impinges on the natural desire to 
connect with others. Sheltered workshops have replaced institutions in many 
states as the new warehousing system and are the new favored locations where 
people with disabilities are sent to occupy their days.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Donna Kam Pun Wong, Do Contacts Make a Difference? The 
Effects of Mainstreaming on Student Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities, 
29 RES. DEV. DISABILITIES 70, 71–73 (2008) (providing a literature review indi-
cating that “[s]ocial contact with peers with disabilities is considered to be a key 
variable in shaping [positive] attitudes” toward disability). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). 
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an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free so-
ciety is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dol-
lars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonpro-
ductivity.63 
As will be shown in Section C, Olmstead is proof that the ADA 
provides for the legal redress of these wrongs. 
C. OLMSTEAD V. L.C. EX REL. ZIMRING 
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court ex-
amined the plight of two institutionalized women, L.C. and 
E.W.,64 who each had developmental disabilities and mental 
health issues.65 In 1992 and 1995 respectively, L.C. and E.W. 
were admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta for psy-
chiatric treatment.66 In both cases, treating physicians deter-
mined that the women could be appropriately treated in a non-
institutional, community-based setting, but they remained 
institutionalized for a long period of time after that determina-
tion had been made.67 In May 1995, three years after her original 
institutionalization at Georgia Regional Hospital, L.C. filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia, arguing that her segregated confinement violated Title 
II of the ADA and the integration mandate.68 E.W. intervened 
and alleged the same claims.69 
The nub of the dispute in Olmstead was whether, given Title 
II of the ADA and the integration mandate, “undue institution-
alization qualifies as discrimination by reason of . . . disability”70 
such that the State of Georgia could be sued pursuant to 
 
 63. Id. § 12101(2), (6), (8). 
 64. Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson are the full names of these women. David 
G. Savage, ADA Umbrella Starting To Close Multiple Rulings Say Act Does Not 
Cover Those with Correctable Impairments, 85 ABA J., Aug. 1999, at 44. Con-
sistent with the text of the Olmstead decision, I will use their initials through-
out. 
 65. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 593–94. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 597–98. 
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42 U.S.C. § 198371 to require the state to cease violating Ti-
tle II.72 Put another way, the court asked “whether the [ADA’s] 
proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons 
with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in 
institutions.”73 The Court held that “[u]njustified isolation . . . is 
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability,”74 sub-
ject to three considerations: (1) the fitness of the person for a 
noninstitutional placement; (2) the state’s commitment to pro-
vide treatment for other people with disabilities; and (3) whether 
the person desires to be deinstitutionalized.75 The Court con-
cluded: 
under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-
based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s 
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, 
the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement 
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.76 
The Olmstead decision was a “defining moment.”77 The Court’s 
holding opened the door wide for people in institutions and their 
advocates to sue and seek services integrated into the commu-
nity under Title II. Relying on the strength of Olmstead, advo-
cates have won victories for broad classes of people from AIDS 
patients in New York78 to segregated workers in Oregon.79  
 
 71. The statute states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 72. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597–98. 
 73. Id. at 587. 
 74. Id. at 597. 
 75. Id. at 607. 
 76. Id. 
 77. David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 
26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 770 (2010). Ferleger is critical of Olmstead for various 
reasons, largely because of the caveats employed by Justice Ginsburg to limit 
the scope of the ruling. See id. at 771–78. Yet, even as a critic of the decision, he 
does not diminish the importance of its holding. See id. at 771. 
 78. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 79. Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 590 (D. Or. 2012). 
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D. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
Having covered the ADA, it is now time to turn to its educa-
tional analogue, IDEA. Though the ADA and IDEA are both ex-
pressly intended to protect the rights of people with disabilities, 
they are distinct—both in the level of protection they provide and 
in the standards that govern their enforcement. This Section 
provides an overview of IDEA. Subsection 1 outlines the struc-
ture and design of IDEA and Subsection 2 discusses the salient 
distinctions between it and the ADA. 
1. Understanding IDEA’s Statutory Mandates 
IDEA80 is the primary federal statute governing special ed-
ucation.81 It was originally passed as the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act,82 and now exists in its current form as a 
result of a number of amendments.83 
IDEA was passed to guarantee students with disabilities the 
right to a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE).84 This 
guarantee imposes a number of duties on the public schools of a 
state, including not only provision of a FAPE, but the duty to 
find all children with disabilities within their boundaries (Child 
Find)85 and provide them with individualized services called an 
 
 80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). 
 81. For a general overview of IDEA, see Therese Craparo, Remembering the 
“Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 472–92 (2003). 
 82. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1461 (1976)). 
 83. See Craparo, supra note 81, at 474–77 (providing a history of IDEA and 
its predecessors). 
 84. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (stating that the law was passed to “ensure that 
all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to 
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, 
and independent living”). 
 85. The statute provides: 
All children with disabilities residing in the State, including children 
with disabilities who are homeless children or are wards of the State 
and children with disabilities attending private schools, regardless of 
the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special educa-
tion and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated and a 
practical method is developed and implemented to determine which 
children with disabilities are currently receiving needed special educa-
tion and related services. 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
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Individualized Education Program (IEP).86 An IEP is a docu-
ment which is assembled by a group of school officials (IEP 
team),87 with input from parents and—as appropriate—the stu-
dent, designed to provide each child with educational services 
adapted to meet individual needs.88 An IEP contains, inter alia: 
a description of the child’s present academic performance; goals; 
current progress; required services and supports; individual ac-
commodations; and a specific description of how the program will 
be administered.89 States delegate Child Find and IEP duties to 
school districts or other such organizations, which IDEA refers 
to as Local Educational Agencies (LEA or LEAs).90 
Under IDEA, a FAPE must  
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State ed-
ucational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary 
school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) [be] 
provided in conformity with the individualized education program.91 
In addition, a FAPE must “to the maximum extent appropriate” 
be provided in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE).92 The 
baseline LRE is defined as the general education classroom.93 
The LRE requirement demonstrates “‘IDEA’s strong preference 
for “mainstreaming,” or educating children with disabilities “[t]o 
the maximum extent appropriate” alongside their non-disabled 
peers.’”94 
The decision of where to educate a child with an IEP “[i]s 
made by a group of persons, including the parents, and other 
persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the eval-
uation data, and the placement options.”95 However, parents do 
not have the final say; 20 U.S.C. § 1415 establishes grievance 
 
 86. Id. § 1412(a)(4) (“An individualized education program . . . is developed, 
reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability.”). 
 87. See 34 C.F.R. § 330.321 (2017) (describing the makeup of an IEP team). 
 88. See Contents of the IEP, CTR. FOR PARENT INFO. & RES. (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/iepcontents. 
 89. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (listing the specific requirements of an 
IEP). 
 90. LEA are defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). 
 91. Id. § 1401(9). 
 92. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 93. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2017). 
 94. M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(1). 
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procedures for parents who are dissatisfied with a LEA’s han-
dling of their child’s education.96 Before a lawsuit can be filed to 
vindicate a student’s rights under IDEA, they must first exhaust 
the administrative remedies available under the statute.97 
Despite IDEA’s strong preference for mainstreaming and in-
struction in the general education classroom, IDEA’s definition 
of a FAPE carries a weaker integration requirement than the 
ADA.98 It is arguable that the LRE requirement is akin to the 
integration mandate, in that the LRE regulation asserts that 
students should be placed in the general education classroom to 
“the maximum extent appropriate”99 and the integration man-
date uses the phrase “most integrated setting appropriate.”100 
On the other hand, IDEA’s text explicitly discusses “separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the 
regular educational environment.”101 IDEA case law also holds 
that the Act allows for segregated settings.102 
2. Distinguishing IDEA and the ADA 
Where Olmstead’s holding is that the ADA provides broad 
protections, the major Supreme Court case interpreting IDEA is 
 
 96. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 
 97. See id. § 1415(l) (requiring exhaustion of the due process hearing and 
appeal under §§ 1415(f ) and (g) prior to filing suit). The exhaustion requirement 
is discussed in more detail at infra Part III.A. 
 98. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.17; see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (explaining that stu-
dents with disabilities should be integrated with their peers without disabilities 
“to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person . . . 
[and a] recipient shall place a handicapped person in the regular educational 
environment operated by the recipient unless it is demonstrated by the recipient 
that the education of the person in the regular environment with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 99. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34. 
 100. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017). 
 101. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 102. See, e.g., Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (“In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the 
court should determine whether the services which make that placement supe-
rior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. . . . [S]ome handi-
capped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities . . . .”). For a 
review of the differing approaches of the circuits to the LRE requirement and 
IDEA compliance, see generally, Angela Estrella-Lemus, An IDEA for Special 
Education: Why the IDEA Should Have Primacy over the ADA in Adjudicating 
Education Claims for Students with Disabilities, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 405, 440–42 (2014); Megan Roberts, The Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Unten-
able Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1059–72 
(2008). 
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narrow. In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School District v. Rowley, the Court set a low standard for deter-
mining whether a LEA is meeting the FAPE requirements of 
IDEA.103 In Rowley, the Court was asked to determine if a LEA 
was providing a FAPE to a young deaf girl, where she was per-
forming well in comparison to her peers, but below her own po-
tential due to the classroom environment in which she was being 
educated.104 The Court asked first if defendants had complied 
with IDEA’s procedural requirements, and then inquired 
whether “the individualized educational program developed 
through the Act’s procedures [was] reasonably calculated to en-
able the child to receive educational benefits” and nothing 
more.105 After Rowley, the decisions of the IEP team need only 
provide “an appropriate education,” not one “that provides eve-
rything that might be thought desirable by loving parents,” or 
one that helps the child reach their full potential.106 
Though Rowley does not interpret the LRE provisions of 
IDEA, the low standard it set has nonetheless had an effect on 
how the circuits have interpreted the LRE requirement: 
It is well settled that the LRE mandate does not require school districts 
to place students in their neighborhood schools in all situations. For 
financial reasons most school districts centralize many special educa-
tion services. In the overwhelming majority of lawsuits in which a par-
ent contests a placement in a school other than the neighborhood 
school, the courts have found that the student’s IEP required the cen-
tralized placement.107 
 
 103. See 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). 
 104. Id. at 184–85. 
 105. Id. at 206–07. 
 106. Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Free Union Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 
1989)). The “loving parents” language is frequently used by courts in IDEA 
cases. See, e.g., Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. D.B. ex rel. G.S.B., No. 1:14-CV-02794-
RWS, 2015 WL 5691136, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2015); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. 
Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., No. 062136, 2008 WL 682595, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
10, 2008), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. J.R. v. Sylvan Union 
Sch. Dist., No. 06-2136, 2008 WL 2345103 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2008); P.J. By & 
Through W.J. v. Conn. Bd. of Educ., 788 F. Supp. 673, 679 (D. Conn. 1992); 
Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 107. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over?, 
114 ED. L. REP. 1011, 1012 (1997). Osborne’s article provides a useful discussion 
of competing standards for interpreting LRE requirements. Id. at 1015–25. The 
article is somewhat old, but the leading cases on LRE that it discusses remain 
good law. 
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The result of these interpretations is a powerful law that, as will 
be shown in Part II below, still seems to permit schools to segre-
gate students from their peers without disabilities in separate 
school buildings. 
II.  INTEGRATION CHALLENGES TO SEGREGATED 
SCHOOLS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES   
Throughout the United States, state and local governments 
run special education programs for students that segregate stu-
dents with disabilities into separate schools.108 According to sta-
tistics published by the U.S. Department of Education in 2015, 
across the United States and Puerto Rico, 146,581 students with 
disabilities ages six to eighteen attended separate, segregated-
site school buildings.109 This Part will examine a surprisingly 
unexplored frontier in Olmstead litigation: applying the ADA in-
tegration mandate to educational segregation of students with 
disabilities. First, Section A explains that even though IDEA 
provides individual students with disabilities a substantive right 
to a FAPE,110 that right has traditionally been interpreted to of-
fer few remedies for students who end up placed in educational 
settings that they do not prefer. Section B will provide an over-
view of the two cases that have argued that segregated-site 
schools violate Title II of the ADA. It will then provide a sum-
mary of the argument that students who are displeased with 
their segregated educational placements can bring actions under 
Title II of the ADA, seeking to receive their educational services 
in the most integrated setting. 
A. IDEA AND SEGREGATED EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENTS 
Though IDEA protects many rights of students, it does not 
explicitly protect their rights to receive services in an integrated 
 
 108. See, e.g., Emma Brown, Justice Department Sues Georgia Over Segre-
gation of Students with Disabilities, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/08/23/justice-department-sues 
-georgia-over-segregation-of-students-with-disabilities/?utm_term= 
75f7fd223abd (describing how GNETS segregates students with disabilities into 
separate school buildings).  
 109. See Data, supra note 21. The state of Georgia, where the GNETS pro-
gram described in the introduction is located, accounts for only 2607, or 1.78% 
of those students. Id. 
 110. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a) (2012). 
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environment.111 As described above, aggrieved students and 
their families must exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies 
prior to filing suits challenging their educational placement.112 
In theory, this is a reasonable requirement: 
[i]t prevents courts from interrupting permanently the administrative 
process, it allows the agency to apply its specialized expertise to the 
problem, it gives the agency an opportunity to correct its own errors, it 
ensures that there will be a complete factual record for the court to 
review, and it prevents the parties from undermining the agency by 
deliberately flouting the administrative process.113 
However, in practice this requirement can completely prevent a 
litigant from reaching court. Administrative exhaustion requires 
a student to remain in an educational placement that they dis-
like, while first going through the administrative process itself, 
and then while litigating the dispute in court.114 Students are 
much more likely to settle, move away, or move to a charter or 
private school than reach the end of such a drawn-out legal pro-
cess, even when the proposed placement is extremely unfavora-
ble. For example, one student in Georgia, Libby Beem, was ag-
grieved when the state attempted to move her to GNETS.115 As 
part of that move, the school district tried to require her to un-
dergo a psychological experiment. In the proposed experiment a 
school psychologist named Whitmarsh, subjected Libby to great 
discomfort. 
Whitmarsh alone would sit with Libby three hours a day, for eight to 
10 weeks, trying to figure out what might provoke her into an outburst. 
Then he would do whatever bothered her. 
 
 111. See supra Part I.D. As the statute explains, 
to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, includ-
ing children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are 
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, sepa-
rate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the 
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or sever-
ity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes 
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved sat-
isfactorily. 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 112. See § 1415(l) (laying out IDEA exhaustion requirements). 
 113. Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Require-
ments and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and Proposals for 
Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349, 360–61 
(2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 114. 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2017) (“[U]nless the State or local agency and 
the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the complaint 
must remain in his or her current educational placement.”). 
 115. Judd, supra note 8. 
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  He might make sudden loud noises or tell her she had performed 
tasks incorrectly. He might order her to complete assignments in sub-
jects she hated. He might ignore her altogether. 
  No matter how Libby responded, whether she threw school supplies 
or struck herself in the head, Whitmarsh would simply watch, he said 
later. A colleague in the next room would take notes on Libby’s reac-
tions. The notes could be used later to develop a treatment plan. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Julie Beem[, Libby’s mother,] said that . . . Whitmarsh men-
tioned his plan to wear protective clothing—“so [Julie] didn’t need to 
worry about him.”116 
The Beems disapproved of this unusual treatment plan and went 
through an IDEA due process hearing.117 Although the adminis-
trative law judge agreed that the state should not force Libby to 
undergo the experiment, the judge said the state could nonethe-
less require her to enter the GNETS program.118 Rather than 
face GNETS or continue to court, the Beems put Libby into an 
online charter school.119 
This is not an unusual result: 
It is well settled that . . . school districts [are not required] to place stu-
dents in their neighborhood schools in all situations. . . . In the over-
whelming majority of lawsuits in which a parent contests a placement 
in a school other than the neighborhood school, the courts have found 
that the student’s IEP required the centralized placement.120 
As a result, a student with disabilities can end up in a segregated 
school, cut off from their nondisabled peers, based on determina-
tions made by a child’s IEP team but without parental approval. 
The parents can challenge it using IDEA’s administrative pro-
cess and ultimately discover that their objection to a segregated 
placement has no further recourse under IDEA. This is exactly 
what happened with the Beems.121 However, as the lawsuit filed 
against GNETS by the Department of Justice shows, IDEA is not 
the only place to turn for a remedy. 
B. APPLYING OLMSTEAD TO SEGREGATED SCHOOLS FOR 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
Surprisingly, Olmstead and the ADA have not been applied 
to public schools until very recently. As far as can be discerned, 
there have been only two attempts. One attempt is the suit filed 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Osborne, Jr., supra note 107. 
 121. See Judd, supra note 8. 
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by the Department of Justice against the State of Georgia and 
GNETS.122 In that case, the Department explicitly relied on 
Olmstead and the ADA without any reference to IDEA.123 The 
case is still pending,124 and it is currently unclear whether the 
recent change in presidential administrations will result in any 
change in approach to this particular type of civil rights enforce-
ment at the Department of Justice.125 
The Department of Justice complaint is an excellent blue-
print for a challenge to segregated-site school placements under 
Olmstead and the ADA. Relying substantially on the rationale of 
Olmstead, the Department alleged four things that set up an ef-
fective claim. First, they alleged that GNETS programs are 
“[s]egregated, [i]nstitutional, [s]ettings.”126 Second, they alleged 
that “for over 40 years, the State has operated, administered, 
and funded the GNETS Program in mostly segregated settings, 
largely to the exclusion of integrated alternatives.”127 Third, 
they argued that GNETS students are “[q]ualified to [r]eceive 
[s]ervices in [m]ore [i]ntegrated [s]ettings and [d]o [n]ot [o]ppose 
[i]t.”128 Fourth and finally, they asserted that “[t]he State can 
reasonably modify its programs, policies, and services to remedy 
these Title II violations and avoid discrimination against stu-
dents in or at risk of placement in the GNETS Program.”129 The 
course charted by the complaint hews closely to the course 
charted by the Olmstead plurality: 
[U]nder Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-
based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s 
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, 
the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement 
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabili-
ties.130 
 
 122. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 123. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1, 65. Count I 
alleges that “Defendant has violated and continues to violate the ADA by ad-
ministering its mental health and therapeutic educational service system in a 
manner that fails to serve students in the GNETS Program in the most inte-
grated setting appropriate to their needs.” Id. ¶ 68. 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Pratt, supra note 3. 
 126. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10, at 12. 
 127. Id. ¶ 38, at 14. 
 128. Id. at 16. 
 129. Id. ¶ 57, at 21. 
 130. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). 
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The second example of a court challenge to segregated-site 
schools was in 2015, in S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield.131 
There, a proposed class of plaintiffs with disabilities sued 
Springfield Public Schools, asserting that the defendants’ deci-
sion to place them in segregated, educationally inferior separate 
school facilities, rather than “neighborhood schools”132 violated 
Title II of the ADA.133 This claim admitted that plaintiffs were 
receiving the services mandated by IDEA—a FAPE in the LRE—
and thus relied totally on the integration mandate for the re-
quested relief: placement in a more integrated environment.134 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Title II, which the court denied.135 In doing so, the court 
relied on a tried and true Olmstead rationale: “Plaintiffs have 
alleged that Defendants discriminated against S.S. in violation 
of Title II by placing S.S. in a segregated educational environ-
ment even though, had he been provided with reasonable accom-
modations, he could have been placed in a neighborhood 
school,”136 and that “[p]laintiffs have adequately pled that the 
exclusion of S.S. from the neighborhood schools was by reason of 
his disability.”137 
These two examples illustrate the potential power of the in-
tegration mandate in the context of education. When school dis-
tricts elect to congregate students with disabilities in separate-
site schools, they are placing students in a facially less-inte-
grated environment by limiting those students’ ability to inter-
act with their nondisabled peers. Segregated-site schools are, 
quite literally, segregated schools. As the preamble to Title II 
regulations provides, the most integrated environment is one 
that “enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-
disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.”138 Segregated-
site schools are unquestionably limiting students’ peer groups, 
and thus they present a fertile ground for new integration suits. 
 
 131. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 146 F. Supp. 3d 414 (D. Mass. 
2015). 
 132. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 318 F.R.D. 210, 214 (D. Mass. 
2016) (“‘Neighborhood school’ is a term used in this litigation to refer to elemen-
tary and middle schools which primarily enroll students based on their residen-
tial address . . . .”). 
 133. S.S. ex rel. S.Y., 146 F. Supp. 3d at 416. 
 134. Id. at 425. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (2017) (addressing § 35.130). 
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Even if a court were to consider a segregated classroom to be the 
most appropriate setting for a student, having such placements 
occur in a school with general education classrooms where the 
student has access to his or her nondisabled peers is simply more 
integrated than a segregated-site placement. Advocates can and 
should identify potential plaintiffs who are displeased with their 
separate-site placements and consider instituting litigation to 
help those students, at the very least, be integrated into schools 
that have both special- and general-education classrooms where 
they can seek to have access to the community, like the ADA re-
quires. However, advocates should also be aware of the barriers 
to such lawsuits, discussed in Part III below. 
III.  POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO TITLE II CLAIMS AGAINST 
SEGREGATED-SITE SCHOOLS   
This Part will examine three potential barriers to Title II 
integration mandate claims against segregated-site schools: (1) 
administrative exhaustion; (2) states’ power to rely on the rea-
sonable opinions of their reasonable treating professionals;139 
and (3) the fundamental alteration defense.140 Section A will in-
troduce IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and discuss its potential 
effect on ADA suits against segregated-site schools, in both the 
individual and class action contexts. Then it will examine a 
newly decided Supreme Court case, Fry v. Napoleon Community 
Schools,141 to consider potential arguments that IDEA exhaus-
tion does not apply to integration suits against separate-site 
schools. Section B will argue that Olmstead’s discussion of reli-
ance on the reasonable opinions of treating professionals should 
not pose a bar to integration suits against segregated-site 
schools. Finally, Section C will briefly introduce the concept of a 
fundamental alteration defense and argue that it is unlikely to 
be applicable in this context. 
A. EXHAUSTION UNDER IDEA 
1. Exhaustion and Its Application to IDEA 
Exhaustion is an administrative law doctrine that requires 
parties to pursue all available avenues of administrative relief 
 
 139. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999). 
 140. See infra Part III.C. 
 141. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
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before seeking judicial review.142 Though exhaustion is a com-
mon law doctrine,143 it is routinely enshrined in statutes as a 
prerequisite to suit.144 There are two major purposes of exhaus-
tion. The first is to tap into the expertise of agencies: 
Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature 
interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function 
efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own 
errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience 
and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial 
review.145 
The second rationale underlying exhaustion is efficiency-driven: 
[E]xhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved 
much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency 
than in litigation in federal court. In some cases, claims are settled at 
the administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the 
agency convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in federal 
court.146 
One provision of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), requires exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies available under the statute be-
fore filing suit under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or other sim-
ilar statute if the requested relief is “also available” under 
IDEA.147 One barrier to Title II claims against schools has been 
 
 142. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 
(1938) (“[T]he long-settled rule of judicial administration [is] that no one is en-
titled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 
administrative remedy has been exhausted.”). 
 143. See Exhaustion of Remedies, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“The doctrine that, if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, a claim-
ant must seek relief first from the administrative body before judicial relief is 
available.”). 
 144. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (providing the exhaustion requirement 
codified in the Administrative Procedure Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (“No 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 
are exhausted.”). 
 145. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); see also Woodford v. NGO, 
548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (“[E]xhaustion protects ‘administrative agency author-
ity.’” (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992))). 
 146. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89. 
 147. Section 1415(l) (2012) provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, 
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.], Title V of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 791 et seq.], or other Federal 
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that be-
fore the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also 
available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f ) 
and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had 
the action been brought under this subchapter. 
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courts’ tendencies to read this provision very broadly, requiring 
that exhaustion is necessary unless the requested relief could 
not be available under IDEA148 or potentially requiring exhaus-
tion as long as IDEA could offer even de minimis relief.149 This 
means that parties that want to sue separate-site schools alleg-
ing violation of the integration mandate could potentially be 
forced to face long administrative proceedings which are unlikely 
to provide the relief they seek.150 Since IDEA regulations permit 
segregation, so long as the facilities are comparable.151 “If a [fed-
eral IDEA funding] recipient . . . operates a facility that is iden-
tifiable as being for handicapped persons, the recipient shall en-
sure that the facility and the services and activities provided 
therein are comparable to the other facilities, services, and ac-
tivities of the recipient.”152 By the same token, those defending 
Title II suits could deflect or delay judicial scrutiny by forcing 
administrative process on the plaintiffs. 
A notable example of this kind of delay occurred in S.S. ex 
rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield,153 discussed in Part II above. After 
the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss on the merits, the 
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on the grounds that 
[w]hen a plaintiff brings a suit under a statute other than the IDEA, 
exhaustion is still required if the relief sought is also available under 
the IDEA. . . . 
  . . . . 
 
 148. See, e.g., Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 623 (6th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (requiring IDEA exhaustion where separate stat-
utory claims are “essentially educational”); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 
675 F.3d 26, 39 n.5 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Like an IDEA claim, a non-IDEA claim that 
seeks relief also available under the IDEA must be exhausted administratively 
through the IDEA’s due process hearing procedures before it can be brought in 
a civil action in state or federal court.”); S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 
318 F.R.D. 210, 221 (D. Mass. 2016) (“When a plaintiff brings a suit under a 
statute other than the IDEA, exhaustion is still required if the relief sought is 
also available under the IDEA . . . .”). 
 149. See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 
(10th Cir. 2000) (“In essence, the dispositive question generally is whether the 
plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s 
administrative procedures and remedies. If so, exhaustion of those remedies is 
required.” (emphasis added)). 
 150. This is because, as noted above, courts have not interpreted FAPE re-
quirements to provide an effective integration guarantee. See supra Parts I.D, 
II.A. 
 151. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (rejecting the notion 
of “separate but equal” in racially segregated schools). 
 152. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(c) (2017). 
 153. 318 F.R.D. 210 (D. Mass. 2016). 
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  . . . . While Plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate a violation of the 
IDEA in order to prevail on their ADA claim, their claim does concern 
the delivery of services to students whose educational programs are 
governed by IEPs.154 
The S.S. court’s interpretation of § 1415(l) potentially presents a 
barrier to Title II suits against segregated-site schools because 
educational placement is an essential element of a FAPE, and 
therefore could feasibly always be challenged in an IDEA pro-
ceeding.155 A strict reading of the IDEA exhaustion requirement 
is especially problematic for class action plaintiffs because put-
ting together a class of plaintiffs who must first exhaust their 
administrative remedies would make finding and qualifying 
class members much harder. In addition, such a requirement 
would potentially slow down the entire process, since an influx 
of due process hearing requests all at once would likely bog down 
the exhaustion process. 
2. Exceptions to Exhaustion Doctrines for Class Plaintiffs 
Because of the novelty of this kind of litigation, it is not ob-
vious if other courts will require classes to be limited only to par-
ties who have previously exhausted, as happened in S.S.156 
There are persuasive arguments that a court should waive the 
exhaustion requirement as to class plaintiffs, provided at least 
one named plaintiff exhausts. For example, in the context of So-
cial Security exhaustion, a party must either exhaust or have 
been unable to exhaust by the time of the filing of the suit to join 
a plaintiff ’s class,157 meaning that some plaintiffs may join the 
 
 154. Id. at 221–22. 
 155. For example, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A) (2012) provides that “[s]chool 
personnel may consider any unique circumstances on a case-by-case basis when 
determining whether to order a change in placement for a child with a disability 
who violates a code of student conduct.” This lays the foundations of student 
placement decisions in IDEA and makes any child’s dissatisfaction with her ed-
ucational placement ostensibly remediable under IDEA. 
 156. For a discussion of the interaction of statutory exhaustion and class 
certification from the lens of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see Elizabeth S. 
Hess, Administrative Exhaustion and Class Actions: Rules, Rights, Require-
ments, Remedies, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act Issue Resolved, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 773, 775 (2003). For a discussion of IDEA class actions generally, 
see Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 471, 475 (2014). 
 157. Hess, supra note 156, at 786 (“For class actions brought under the So-
cial Security Act, membership is limited to claimants who have exhausted their 
remedies, as well as those who still had an opportunity to do so when the suit 
was filed.”). 
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suit without being required to have exhausted administrative 
remedies. 
In the context of employment law, some courts have exam-
ined the purposes of exhaustion requirements to conclude that 
requiring class-wide exhaustion under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act158 is actually contrary to the intent behind the crea-
tion of a statutory exhaustion requirement.159 “It would be 
wasteful, if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same 
grievance, to have to process many identical complaints with 
EEOC. If it is impossible to reach a settlement with one discrim-
inatee, what reason would there be to assume that the next one 
would be successful[?]”160 This rationale is arguably applicable 
under IDEA as well. If one plaintiff has sought an administrative 
remedy and found it unavailable, it is patently inefficient to force 
dozens or hundreds of other plaintiffs to pursue the same pro-
cess. It flies in the face of the rationale of exhaustion, by reducing 
efficiency and adding little or no expertise to the process. 
The legislative history of IDEA’s predecessor statute, The 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act,161 also supports 
the idea that class plaintiffs are not intended to be required to 
exhaust. During floor debates, the Act’s author opined, “Nor is it 
intended that the availability of these administrative procedures 
be construed so as to require each member of the class to exhaust 
such procedures in any class action brought to redress an alleged 
violation of the statute.”162 Legislative history of amendments to 
the law also reflects this line of reasoning. In 1985, Senator Paul 
Simon opined, “[Section 1415] is also clearly not intended to mod-
ify traditional standards used by the courts for determining 
when a class action suit can be filed.”163 Furthermore, some 
courts have also reached the conclusion that exhaustion for all 
 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012) (requiring plaintiffs to first seek ad-
ministrative remedies through the EEOC before filing suit). 
 159. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 160. Id. (quoting Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th 
Cir. 1968)). 
 161. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1461 (1976)). 
 162. 121 CONG. REC. 37416 (1975) (statement of Sen. A. Harrison Williams). 
 163. 131 CONG. REC. 21393 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (emphasis 
added). 
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class members is unnecessary, finding that the purposes of ex-
haustion make class-wide exhaustion unnecessary.164 Forcing 
class plaintiffs to exhaust en masse opens the door for incon-
sistent rulings, confusion, and an incredible amount of wasted 
effort when a court finally hears a class action and ultimately 
resolves the case for the entire class. When considering all of 
these facts together, there is very little support for the idea that 
every class member in an IDEA class action should be forced to 
exhaust. 
The plaintiffs in S.S. apparently failed to raise these issues, 
because the court, in denying certification on exhaustion 
grounds specifically noted that 
[w]hile [the named plaintiff ] exhausted his administrative remedies 
prior to this litigation, Plaintiffs have not limited the proposed class to 
include only those who have exhausted their IDEA procedural reme-
dies. Plaintiffs also have not argued that there is an exception to the 
exhaustion requirement applicable simply because Plaintiffs have 
framed this litigation as a class action, and the court has found no such 
exception. . . .165 
Given the analysis above, it is fair to say that the court’s position 
on class-wide exhaustion in S.S. was wrong both as a matter of 
policy and as a matter of law. However, in view of this ruling, 
and the plaintiffs’ apparent failure to raise these issues before 
the court, future plaintiffs will do well to be aware of the poten-
tial problems IDEA’s exhaustion requirement can cause class-
litigants asserting ADA claims and to prepare to meet such chal-
lenges with thorough and well-reasoned arguments. 
3. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools: Evading IDEA 
Exhaustion for Suits Under the ADA 
Another way to overcome the IDEA’s exhaustion provision 
is to show that it is inapplicable to a suit under Title II of the 
ADA and the integration mandate. A recent development in case 
law governing IDEA now controls this corner of the legal land-
scape. On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Fry v. 
 
 164. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 
2002) (“The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies avail-
able under the IDEA is not absolute.”); L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd., 516 F. 
Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“To [require exhaustion by all class mem-
bers] would expose the School Board to potentially inconsistent rulings on their 
standard policy, ultimately requiring an eventual resolution of the issue by a 
federal district court. Under the facts alleged here, exhaustion by class members 
would be needless and futile.”). 
 165. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 318 F.R.D. 210, 221 (D. Mass. 
2016). 
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Napoleon Community Schools.166 In Fry, the Supreme Court 
clarified the legal standards that govern whether relief sought 
on ADA grounds is “also available under” IDEA.167 This new test 
to determine if IDEA exhaustion requirements under 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) apply to ADA claims says that, “exhaustion 
is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff ’s suit is 
something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee—
[a FAPE].”168 In instituting this test, the Court rejected more 
stringent exhaustion standards, like those described above,169 
which, for example, ask if relief is “essentially educational.”170 In 
Fry, the Supreme Court has strengthened the argument that 
IDEA exhaustion under § 1415 is unnecessary for a suit based 
on Title II and the integration mandate. 
In explaining how the standard operates, the Court noted 
that the exhaustion requirement hinges on whether a hearing 
officer in the IDEA’s administrative process could grant any re-
lief. Thus, the necessity of exhaustion depends on whether the 
complaint asserts a denial of a FAPE.171 The Court explained: 
Suppose that a parent’s complaint protests a school’s failure to provide 
some accommodation for a child with a disability. If that accommoda-
tion is needed to fulfill the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, the hearing of-
ficer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dis-
pute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends. 
There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to 
make the requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like 
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act) might require the accommodation on 
one of those alternative grounds. . . . But still, the hearing officer can-
not provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is to enforce 
the child’s “substantive right” to a FAPE. And that is all.172 
The idea, then, will be for plaintiffs to do as the Department of 
Justice did against the State of Georgia and rely only on the text 
of the ADA, rather than on any provision in IDEA.173 However, 
it is not quite that simple, because the Court expressly disa-
vowed attempts to merely end run the requirements: “If a law-
 
 166. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
 167. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 746 (2017). 
 168. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748. 
 169. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 170. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622, 623 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 
137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
 171. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. 
 172. Id. (citation omitted). 
 173. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Complaint, supra note 10. 
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suit charges such a denial [of a FAPE], the plaintiff cannot es-
cape §1415(l) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other 
than IDEA.”174 
How does one differentiate between claims for denial of a 
FAPE and claims that substantively rely on the ADA? The 
Court’s standard asks whether “the plaintiff [could or] could not 
get any relief from [IDEA] procedures.”175 Because part of a 
child’s placement is an element of her IEP,176 simply challenging 
a placement is likely relief “also available” under IDEA.177 How-
ever, the Court adds that “[a] school’s conduct toward such a 
child [with disabilities]—say, some refusal to make an accommo-
dation—might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE.”178 This 
is the key idea. Like the Department of Justice argued in Geor-
gia, plaintiffs who oppose their placement in a segregated-site 
school may admit that the school is meeting its baseline FAPE 
requirements, but allege that the school placement injures them 
on integration grounds. Therefore, they would arguably be “al-
leg[ing] only disability-based discrimination, without making 
any reference to the adequacy of the special education ser-
vices.”179 
This approach could potentially put plaintiffs seeking to 
bring a desegregation claim against a segregated-site school—
without exhausting—in an unusual or even potentially incon-
sistent position. One way to attempt to avoid the exhaustion re-
quirement is to assert that the separate-site school is success-
fully providing the student a FAPE, but is still violating the 
integration mandate, as the plaintiffs in S.S. did.180 As a result, 
the antiexhaustion argument would assert that the school is 
meeting the requirements of IDEA and thus “the plaintiff could 
not get any relief from [IDEA’s administrative] procedures.”181 
Of course, this line of reasoning may be antithetical to the goals 
of plaintiffs who are both dissatisfied with the quality of educa-
tion their child is receiving and dissatisfied with the setting in 
 
 174. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.  
 175. Id. 
 176. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(7) (2017). 
 177. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). 
 178. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. 
 179. Id. at 758. 
 180. S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield, 146 F. Supp. 3d 414, 424 (D. Mass. 
2015) (“Plaintiffs have acquiesced to its ruling that S.S., even when placed in a 
segregated environment exclusively with other students with mental health dis-
abilities, was provided with FAPE in the LRE . . . .”). 
 181. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. 
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which it is offered. On the other hand, IDEA exhaustion is a 
lengthy process and is more sympathetic to segregated facili-
ties.182 Therefore, challenging such settings for denial of a FAPE 
is not an obviously promising line of attack. Moreover, plaintiffs 
who want both IDEA and ADA relief are able to elect to exhaust 
if they so choose. 
Of course, there are other ways to challenge the exhaustion 
requirement, and therefore creativity is powerful. For example, 
because IDEA and its implementing regulations require the LRE 
rather than simple integration, plaintiffs could rely on the dis-
tinction between the idea of a restrictive setting and an inte-
grated setting as the basis for their suit. Plaintiffs may also rea-
sonably argue that the complaint is “a suit brought under a 
different statute,”183 seeking a different remedy, and therefore 
“the gravamen of the plaintiff ’s suit”184 is to vindicate a right not 
offered under IDEA: to receive services in “the most integrated 
setting.”185 Under this approach, finding a way to stress that a 
segregated classroom and a segregated school building will offer 
functionally equivalent services will be a fact-specific inquiry. 
Because LEAs are just that, these comparisons will be neces-
sarily context-specific. 
To summarize, plaintiffs seeking to use Title II to challenge 
placement in a segregated-site school have a variety of ways to 
do it. Individual plaintiffs may elect to seek relief under the ad-
ministrative process supplied by IDEA before bringing a Title II 
integration claim.186 For individual plaintiffs who are unhappy 
with their placement, they are likely to have begun the negotia-
tion portion of this process simply as a part of conflicts with a 
school district over where education will occur. However, if ei-
ther class or individual plaintiffs want to evade exhaustion, they 
can argue that exhaustion does not apply under Fry because 
their claim does not plead a denial of a FAPE.187 In addition, 
class plaintiffs can argue that exhaustion by a single plaintiff is 
enough to meet the requirements of the Act based on the doctri-
nal purposes behind exhaustion requirements, the legislative 
 
 182. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 183. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. 
 184. Id. at 748. 
 185. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017). 
 186. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g) (2012) (detailing IDEA’s administrative hearing 
and appeals process). 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
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history of IDEA’s predecessors, and case law that has upheld this 
principle. 
B. THE STATE’S ABILITY TO RELY ON THE REASONABLE 
ASSESSMENTS OF TREATING PROFESSIONALS 
A majority of the court in Olmstead held that “the State gen-
erally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own profes-
sionals in determining whether an individual meets the essen-
tial eligibility requirements for habilitation in a community-
based program.188 Absent such qualification, it would be inap-
propriate to remove a patient from the more restrictive set-
ting.”189 One potential line of defense for a LEA in a Title II suit 
is that students’ placement in a separate-site school is the result 
of the “reasonable assessments” of its own officials.190 Therefore, 
the argument goes, such determinations are not open to chal-
lenge by plaintiffs where there is a properly instituted IEP. 
There are three major weaknesses to this argument. The 
first is a logical inconsistency; simply comparing a segregated 
school building to a separate classroom in an otherwise inte-
grated neighborhood school does not offer much in the way of 
difference between placements. Students in either environment 
will likely not receive a substantially different classroom experi-
ence, nor will they necessarily be subject to a less restrictive reg-
imen in one or the other. Therefore, to the extent that the place-
ment in a segregated-site facility is the result of the opinion of a 
treating professional, it is difficult to see how the eligibility re-
quirements would differ between the two settings in a way that 
necessitates one placement over the other. This has the potential 
to be an evidence-sensitive examination, but to the extent that 
the two settings are equivalently restrictive and one is signifi-
cantly more integrated than the other, there is fertile ground for 
an integration mandate claim. 
 
 188. “Habilitation services,” according to Medicaid regulation, include “spe-
cial education and related services.” 42 C.F.R. § 440.180(c)(2)(ii) (2017). 
 189. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999). 
 190. Id. Principles of agency seem to suggest that IEP teams would reason-
ably constitute a state’s “treating professionals” under Olmstead for purposes of 
educational placements. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (“The term ‘local educa-
tional agency’ means a public board of education or other public authority le-
gally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, 
or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary 
schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision 
of a State . . . .”). 
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Second, it is not clear that such a placement could be deemed 
reasonable.191 Because Title II and its implementing regulations 
enshrine a right to receive services “in the most integrated set-
ting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disa-
bilities,”192 school districts face a high burden in attempting to 
argue that community placement in a nonsegregated school is 
inappropriate when most plaintiffs will be living in a commu-
nity-based residential setting—at home with their parents. In 
addition, adult plaintiffs in Olmstead litigation have repeatedly 
argued, with success, that their placements in institutions like 
hospitals and nursing homes are inappropriate.193 How can it be 
reasonable to place students in segregated, institution-like set-
tings when they already live in an integrated community setting 
at home? 
This same rationale applies to the daytime activities of peo-
ple with disabilities as well. A recent case, Lane v. Kitzhaber, 
involved a successful Olmstead claim against sheltered work-
shops which segregate adults with disabilities from the commu-
nity during working days.194 Sheltered workshops are an easy 
analogue to schools, because schools fill the same part of the day 
for children as a workplace does for adults. Under this rationale, 
the holding in Lane is more problematic than it would be in the 
context of a case about schools. Potentially, sheltered workshops 
found to violate the integration mandate would end up being un-
usable for providing services to people with disabilities. How-
ever, because school districts are likely to already have special 
 
 191. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603. The reasonable assessments standard has 
been described as a “negligence standard.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and 
Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 (2012). 
This imposes a duty on states. Would a reasonable treating professional believe 
that a segregated school facility was more appropriate than a separate class-
room in a neighborhood school? 
 192. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2017). 
 193. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 581 (ordering integration for plaintiffs 
institutionalized in hospitals); Benjamin v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 1:09-CV-
1182, 2014 WL 4793736, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (giving final approval 
to a settlement agreement giving residents in Intermediate Care Facilities in 
Pennsylvania the right to more integrated placements); Disability Advocates, 
Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that certain 
“adult homes” in New York “are institutions that segregate residents from the 
community and impede residents’ interactions with people who do not have dis-
abilities.”). See generally Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: 
The Definition of “Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J. 
ON C.L. & C.R. 143, 144 (2012) (discussing deinstitutionalization litigation and 
its future). 
 194. 283 F.R.D. 587, 602 (D. Or. 2012). 
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education classrooms in neighborhood school buildings,195 
Olmstead claims against school districts should be much less 
controversial. A school building is useful to students no matter 
who attends it. All that the plaintiffs will be seeking to change 
is the demographics of students who attend particular buildings. 
By contrast, the sheltered workshops at issue in Lane require 
more complex—and potentially fraught—changes to government 
programs,196 yet the plaintiffs were still met with success. 
Finally, some case law suggests that the reasonable assess-
ments standard imposes a duty on states, but is not itself a de-
fense. For example, in a landmark Olmstead case, Disability Ad-
vocates, Inc. v. Paterson, Judge Garaufis of the Eastern District 
of New York wrote, “The court does not read Olmstead as creat-
ing a requirement that a plaintiff alleging discrimination under 
the ADA must present evidence that he or she has been assessed 
by a treatment provider and found eligible to be served in a more 
integrated setting.”197 The result of this holding is that the plain-
tiffs in Paterson were permitted to affirmatively prove during the 
course of litigation that they were eligible for a more integrated 
placement. To the extent that such a holding applies in the IEP 
context, an IEP itself would be no defense.198 
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION DEFENSE 
The fundamental alteration defense holds that the govern-
ment does not have an absolute duty to limit discrimination by 
 
 195. According to U.S. Department of Education data, in 2011 there were 
815,525 students in the general education classroom forty percent or less of the 
time nationwide. See Data, supra note 21 (download 2011 file on Educational 
Environments). The Department defines this category to include, “self-con-
tained special classrooms with full-time special education instruction on a reg-
ular school campus.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., IDEA PART B CHILD COUNT AND ED-
UCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2014–2015, at 6 (2015), https:// 
www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/collection-documentation/data 
-documentation-files/part-b/child-count-and-educational-environment/idea 
-partb-childcountandedenvironment-2014.doc. 
 196. See J. Gardner Armsby, The War on Sheltered Workshops: Will ADA 
Title II Discrimination Lawsuits Terminate an Employment Option for Adults 
with Disabilities?, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 450–52 (2015) (discussing how 
plaintiffs in Lane were met with hostile intervenors who were concerned that 
the suit would restrict their ability to work in sheltered workshops by leading 
to their closure). 
 197. 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 198. For further discussion of this subject, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 
(2012) (discussing the “ambiguity” of the effect of “determinations of the state’s 
treating professionals” under Olmstead in greater depth). 
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modifying its programs. In other words, this defense prevents 
litigants from identifying a service they would like to receive 
and/or a setting in which they would like to receive it in and su-
ing to compel the state to provide it, whether or not it is a part 
of their programs.199 The implementing regulations of the ADA 
say that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications 
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, un-
less the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifi-
cations would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, pro-
gram, or activity.”200 As one court put it, “This regulation 
acknowledges the States’ interests in preserving the essential 
characteristics of their public programs and monitoring public 
expenditures.”201 
In addition to preventing plaintiffs from demanding services 
not already part of the state’s programs, the fundamental alter-
ation defense permits states to use budgetary constraints as a 
defense to integrations suits. “Court[s] must consider, in view of 
the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing 
community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of ser-
vices the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the 
State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.”202 Liti-
gants cannot force the state to discriminate against another set 
of people with disabilities by demanding a remedy that would 
simply change the ratio of funds going to one program or an-
other. 
The fundamental alteration defense should not generally be 
successful in integration suits involving segregated-site schools. 
The reason for this is simple. LEAs are required by law to pro-
vide special education services. LEAs also likely provide some 
students with special education in classrooms in neighborhood 
schools. Given the fact that states are already providing the de-
sired services to some students with disabilities, LEAs will have 
a difficult time asserting that changing the educational place-
ments of students with disabilities will fundamentally alter their 
 
 199. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1208 (D. Or. 2012) 
(describing the “forbidden remedy” of “demand[ing] that defendants provide . . . 
a certain standard of care or level of benefits”). 
 200. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2017). 
 201. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 
489 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 202. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). 
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programs and services. Even were a LEA required to stop oper-
ating a school building as a segregated-site school, it would likely 
still be a feasible location to operate as an integrated school. Re-
quiring LEAs to provide educational services in the “most inte-
grated setting” would not likely fundamentally alter their pro-
grams or services.203 
  CONCLUSION   
Eighteen years after Olmstead, the landscape of disability 
law has changed drastically. There is a nuanced and thoughtful 
body of cases interpreting the decision, and there is a broad ar-
ray of scholarship devoted to supporting legal innovation. Given 
the breadth of the ADA and the power of Olmstead’s holding, it 
is remarkable that schools have come under consideration only 
recently. Because separate-site schools so obviously segregate 
students with disabilities in a setting that is not the most inte-
grated available, advocates can and should bring Title II chal-
lenges against such schools in their states. 
People with disabilities deserve respect and autonomy. 
Olmstead and the ADA are an important vehicle for helping peo-
ple with disabilities vindicate their rights and open the doors to 
independence and integration. Community and mutual respect 
are part of the “promise of Olmstead.”204 That respect cannot de-
velop if kids with disabilities are kept out of sight, and out of 
mind. Providing for educational integration is one important 
way that the promise of Olmstead can be fulfilled. 
 
 203. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). 
 204. See MINN. OLMSTEAD SUBCABINET, PUTTING THE PROMISE OF 
OLMSTEAD INTO PRACTICE: MINNESOTA’S OLMSTEAD PLAN 13 (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/olmstead/documents/pub/dhs16_ 
196300.pdf. 
